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Edwards: Water Law - Importation Doctrine Applied to Water Transfers withi

CASE NOTES
WATER LAW-Importation Doctrine Applied to Water Transfers Within a
River System: A Step Too Far. Thayer v. City of Rawlins, 594 P.2d 951
(Wyo. 1979).

The City of Rawlins imports all of its water from Sage
Creek and the North Platte River. For many years the city's
raw sewage effluent has been discharged into Sugar Creek,
where it has been appropriated for irrigation, stock water,
and drilling purposes Federal' and state3 laws now prohibit the continued discharge of raw sewage. The treatment
plan considered by the city involved diverting effluent into
a lagoon system; this plan required construction of holding
dams and changing the point of discharge for city effluent
to a point lower on Sugar Creek, thus depriving some Sugar
Creek appropriators of the use of that effluent. The city
brought an action in district court, seeking a declaratory
judgment that these appropriators were not entitled to
compensation for loss of the city's effluent even though
their appropriations had been initiated by permits from the
state engineer.
At trial, the main issue was whether Sugar Creek is a
natural stream. Two decisions depended on the resolution
of that issue: whether the state engineer had jurisdiction
over the changes contemplated by the city, and whether the
defendants had a valid appropriation of city effluent on
which to base their claims.
The defendants contended that the treatment plan contemplated by the city required the approval of the state
engineer and the state board of control. Jurisdiction was
said to flow from article VIII of the Wyoming Constitution,4
giving the board of control authority to regulate the waters
of the state; from Section 41-3-104 of the Wyoming StatCopyright

0

1980 by the University of Wyoming

1. Brief for Appellants at 8, Thayer v. City of Rawlins, 594 P.2d 951 (Wyo.
1979).
2. Clean Water Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977), 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.
For an analysis of state water rights under national water quality controls, see Muys, Quality v. Quantity: The Federal Water Pollution Control
Act's Quiet Revolution in Western Water Rights Administration, 23
3.

ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 1013 (1977).
WYO. STAT. §§ 35-11-301 and 35-11-302

(1977).

4. WYO. CONST. art. 8, § 2.
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utes, giving the board of control authority to approve or
deny changes in the use or place of use of water; from
Section 41-3-305 of the Wyoming Statutes,6 giving the state
engineer and the state board of control authority over storage
of natural flows of surface streams; and from Section
41-3-615 of the Wyoming Statutes,7 giving the state engineer
authority over the construction of diversion dams exceeding
a certain height.
The district court found that Sugar Creek is not a
natural stream; it therefore concluded that the state engineer had no jurisdiction over the changes proposed by the
city, and that defendants' appropriations of city effluent
water were invalid. The court held that defendants were
not entitled to compensation for loss of water, and that the
city was not estopped from recapturing its waste water.
The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's judgment, but based its decision on the importation
doctrine. It held that as to the defendants, the city had the
unrestricted right to reuse, successively use, and dispose of
imported water, and that the city's effluent was not subject to abandonment. 8 Finally, the court held that the state
engineer and the board of control had no jurisdiction over
the controversy
THE COURT'S RATIONALE

The court's analysis in Thayer centered on the legal
distinctions between waste water" derived from water imported from another drainage basin, and that derived from
water which never left its natural drainage basin.
Imported water's special status stemmed from the
court's desire to reward the efforts of an importer, who by
5..
6.
7.
8.
..
9.
10.

-WYO..
STAT..

§..41-3-104 (1977).

WYO. STAT. § 41-3-305 (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 41-3-615 (1977).,
Thayer v. City of Rawlins, 594 P.2d 951, 955, 956 (Wyo. 1977). [hereinafter cited in text as Thayer].
Id. at 957, 958.
Waste water, as the term is used in this case note, includes municipal effluent and water-which has left the control of the initial appropriator.
For a discussion of the various terms commonly used to describe water
which has escaped from an appropriator, see HUTcHINs, 2 WATER RIGHTS
LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 568 (1974).
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his work and expense has brought water to one drainage
basin from another.1 ' This policy of rewarding importers
by giving them extra-ordinary dominion over imported
water was reconciled with the rules of prior appropriation
by restricting priorities to those relating to the natural flow
of a stream at the time of appropriation. 2
In the court's thinking, the finding that the city imported its entire water supply was dispositive of all other
issues in Thayer." Relying on a recent Colorado case, City
and County of Denver Board of Water Commissioners v.
Fulton Irrigating Ditch Company, 4 the court held that, as
to the defendants, the city had the unrestricted right to
reuse, successively use, and make disposition of imported
water.15 These terms were defined in Fulton:
"Re-use" means a subsequent use of imported
water for the same purpose as the original use ....
"Successive use" means subsequent use by the
water importer for a different purpose ....
"Right of disposition" means the right to sell,
lease, exchange or otherwise dispose of effluent containing foreign water ....
The Wyoming Supreme Court felt that granting the
city unrestricted rights to its imported water necessarily
meant that the city could not abandon any of these rights
to the defendants." The court felt that such a holding was
consistent with the fact that the defendants could not compel
the city to continue importing water: if the city could not
be forced to continue importing, it could not logically be
forced to continue discharging its effluent to the defendants. 8 The same reasoning led the court to reject the defendants' contention that they were entitled to compensa11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Thayer v. City of Rawlins, supra note 8, at 955.
Id.
Thayer v. City of Rawlins, supra note 8.
City and County of Denver Board of Water Commissioners v. Fulton Irrigating Ditch Company, 179 Colo. 47, 506 P.2d 144 (1972) [hereinafter
cited in text as Fulton].
Thayer v. City of Rawlins, supra note 8.
City and County of Denver Board of Water Commissioners v. Fulton Irrigating Ditch Company, supra note 14, at 146, 147.
Thayer v. City of Rawlins, supra note 8.
Id.
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tion for the loss of water occasioned by the city's change in
its point of discharge. 9
Because it had granted the city unrestricted rights to
its imported water, the court rejected the assertion that the
state engineer and board of control had jurisdiction over
this dispute."0 Given that the city's control of its water left
no room for control by state agencies, the court felt that
the statute governing change in use or place of use of water 2
contained impermissible restrictions. 2 As to the statute
concerning storage of direct-flow rights,2" the court found
no indication of legislative intent to include effluent derived
from imported water.24 Finally, the court disposed of the
statute concerning construction of diversion dams" by
pointing out that the city's plan did not meet the technical
requirements necessary to bring it within the statute.2
BACKGROUND

In deciding the correlative rights of the parties to
the effluent discharged by the city, the Wyoming Supreme
Court was dealing in what had already been called the most
confused area of prior appropriation law. 7 To place Thayer
in perspective, it is helpful to briefly examine the historical
development of several aspects of a senior appropriator's
rights to his waste water, to note any different treatment
of waste water derived from intra-basin water, and to
point out those instances where different rules have been
fashioned for municipalities.
Article VIII, section 1 of the Wyoming Constitution
provides that the state owns the natural waters of the
state.28 Article VIII, sections 29 and 530 give the board of
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id. at 957.

Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-104(1977).
Thayer v. City of Rawlins, supra note 8, at 957, 958.
WYO. STAT. § 41-3-305 (1977).
Thayer v. City of Rawlins, supra note 8 at 958.
WYO. STAT. § 41-3-615 (1977).
Thayer v. City of Rawlins, supra note 8, at 958.
Trelease, Reclamation Water Rights, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 464, 469
(1960).
28. WYO. CoNsT. art. 8, § 1 provides: Water is state property.-The water
of all natural streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still water,
within the boundaries of the state, are hereby declared to be the property
of the state.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol15/iss1/3

4

Edwards: Water Law - Importation Doctrine Applied to Water Transfers withi

1980

CASE NOTES

103

control and the state engineer the authority to supervise
the waters of the state, particularly with reference to their
appropriation, distribution, and diversion." The Wyoming
Supreme Court has construed these constitutional provisions
as restricting valid stream appropriations to the waters of
natural streams," and has laid down guidelines for defining
a natural stream:
[T]he essential characteristics of a water course
are: a channel, consisting of a well-defined bed and
banks, and a current of water. Some exceptions
have been made, the definition has not been applied
in all cases, and it may be difficult to give one that
is universally applicable . . . [citation omitted].
Too much stress ought not, perhaps, be placed
upon any one of the elements mentioned, and all
should be given due consideration."
One early result of restricting appropriations to natural
waters of the state was that waste water discharged into a
dry gulch could not be validly appropriated before it reached
a stream,84 while waste water discharged into a natural
stream became appropriable. 5 In this latter instance, the
fact that the waste water discharged into a natural stream
was municipal effluent did not affect the rule that, as between one appropriating the waste water under state law
and one claiming the same water under a grant from the
person discharging it into the stream, the right of use went
to the prior appropriator under state law.36
29. WYo. CONST. art. 8, § 2 provides: Board of Control.-There shall be
constituted a board of control, to be composed of the state engineer and
superintendents of the water divisions; which shall, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have the supervision of the waters
of the state and of their appropriation, distribution and diversion, and
of the various officers connected therewith. Its decisions to be subject
to review by the courts of the state.
30. WYo. CONST. art. 8, § 5 provides, in part: There shall be a state engineer.
. . . He shall be president of the board of control, and shall have general
supervision of the waters of the state and of the officers connected with
its distribution. No person shall be appointed to this position who has
not such theoretical knowledge and such practical experience and skill as
shall fit him for the position.
31. See note 29, supra.
32. State v. Hiber, 48 Wyo. 172, 44 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1935).
33. Id. at 1009.
34. Id. at 1010.
35. Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing Company, 33 Wyo. 14,
236 P. 764, 773 (1925) [hereinafter cited in text as Wyoming Hereford].
36. Id.
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Later, it became possible to appropriate waste water 7
which did not originally constitute a natural stream, when
5 that irrigation seepage
the court found in Binning v. Miller"
flowing in a gulch for 30 years became a "regular, natural
stream" subject to appropriation. The court felt that "seepage
water which, if not intercepted, would reach a stream, is
just as much a part of the stream as the waters of any
tributaries.""9
This trend was carried to its logical conclusion in
Bower v. Big Horn Canal Association," when the court
allowed the interception and appropriation of seepage water
lost from a canal and flowing toward a natural stream,
even though the seepage did not form a channel.
The general rule with respect to changes in stream
conditions has long been that an appropriator is entitled to
maintenance of stream conditions as they were at the time
of his appropriation." In Colorado, this entitlement is spoken
of as a vested right.2 In Wyoming, this concern for an
appropriator's interest in unchanged stream conditions has
been codified in Section 41-3-104 of the Wyoming Statutes,"
setting out procedures and standards which must be adhered to by any appropriator wishing to change the use or
place of use of his water right. However, the general rule
has been riddled with exceptions;44 as the following paragraphs show, it is now largely honored in the breach.
Two Wyoming cases illustrate the proposition that any
appropriator may stop discharging waste water simply by
ceasing to divert from a stream. In Bower," it was presumed
that
37. See generally, Clark, Background and Trends in Water Salvage Law, 15
ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 421 (1969).
38. Binning v. Miller, 55 Wyo. 451, 102 P.2d 54, 63 (1940) [hereinafter
cited in text as Binning].
39. Id. at 61.
40. Bower v. Big Horn Canal Association, 77 Wyo. 80, 307 P.2d 593, 602
(1957) [hereinafter cited in text as Bower].
41. Farmers Highline Canal and Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo.
575, 272 P.2d 629, 631 (1954).
42. Id.
43. WYo. STAT. § 41-3-104 (1977).
44.

See generally, CLARK, 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 129-133

(1972).

45. Bower v. Big Horn Canal Association, supra note 40, at 601.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol15/iss1/3

6

Edwards: Water Law - Importation Doctrine Applied to Water Transfers withi

1980

CASE NOTES

105

a person using water on his land may abandon his
irrigation altogether and return his lands to a nonirrigated use if he desires to do so. As was said in
the Binning case,46 there is no rule which will require a man to continue irrigating when he does
not so choose.
And a Colorado case can be cited to the same effect: "We
know of no law which compels a party to use his water
right . . ."
An appropriator generally has the right to capture
and reuse his waste water 48 so long as he intercepts it before
it leaves his land and reuses it for the same purpose on the
same lands. Reuse can be initiated at any time. 9 This right
of reuse was extended to water imported by an irrigation
district in Stevens v. Oakdale Irr. Dist.,"° and by a municipality in Fulton.5
The general rule is that an appropriator may change
his point of diversion so long as he does not injure others
on the stream.2 This rule was extended to a municipality
in Metropolitan Denver Sewage Disposal District No. 1 v.
FarmersReservoir and IrrigationCompany.5"
In contrast to the necessity for an appropriator to
avoid injury to other appropriators on the stream when he
proposes to make a change in his point of diversion, at least
one court has said that an appropriator need answer to no
one for changing the point at which he discharges his waste
water. A recent Colorado case involving municipal discharge
of intra-basin water recited older cases which denied users
of waste water any right to have the waste continued; the
46. Binning v. Miller. supra note 38, at 60.
47. Tongue Creek Orchard Company v. Town of Orchard City, 131 Colo. 177,
280 P.2d 426, 429 (1955).
48. See generally, Note, Rights of the Original Appropriator to Recaplure
Water Used in Irrigation, 11 Wyo. L. J. 39 (1956).
49. Binning v. Miller, supra note 38, at 62.
50. Stevens v. Oakdale Irr. Dist., 13 Cal. 2d 343, 90 P.2d 58, 62 (1939)
[hereinafter cited in text as Stevens].
51. City and County of Denver Board of Water Commissioners v. Fulton
Irrigating Ditch Company, supra note 14, at 146.
52. Johnston v. Little Horse Creek Irrigating Co., 13 Wyo. 208, 79 P. 22, 25
(1904).
53. Metropolitan Denver Sewage Disposal District No. 1 v. Farmers Reservoir
and Irrigation Company, 179 Colo. 36, 499 P.2d 1190, 1193 (1972) [hereinafter cited in text as Metro].
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court felt these cases provided a logical basis for holding
that "[c]hanges of points of return of waste water are not
governed by the same rules as changes of points of diversion."" Downstream appropriators were therefore held to
have no vested right to maintenance of the same point of
discharge of either irrigation waste water or municipal
effluent."
Until recently, reuse of waste water was confined to
the same use on the same lands." However, in 1972 a
Colorado case involving the rights of a municipality in its
imported water granted importers" the right to successively
use imported water. 8 This right appears to extend to importers other than municipalities," but the language of the
Colorado Supreme Court suggests that it had in mind water
imported across the Continental Divide by a transmountain
diversion."
Generally, an appropriator of intra-basin water has
not been allowed to dispose of his waste water to third
parties if another appropriator would be injured. 1 In an
early Colorado case, a municipality using intra-basin water
was prevented from selling its purified effluent and was
forced to return it to the stream." The city contended that
its right to sell the water necessarily followed from its right
to dispose of it by evaporation." The court countered:
It would seem that, according to the established public policy of this state, this right to
destroy the water by evaporation can exist only
when there is no other practicable method of disposing of the sewage; ....04
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Binning v. Miller, supra note 38, at 61.
See, Note, Rights of Importers and Developers of Waters, 9 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 543 (1974).

58. City and County of Denver Board of Water Commissioners v. Fulton Irrigating Ditch Company, supra note 14, at 146.
59. Id. at 148.
60. Id.
61.

See text accompanying notes 48 and 49, supra.

Pulaski Irr. Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad, 70 Colo. 565, 203 P. 681, 682
(1922).
63. Id. at 683.
64. Id.
62.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol15/iss1/3
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The Wyoming rule with respect to disposition of municipal effluent has developed along different lines. In Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing Company," the
City of Cheyenne was allowed to sell its untreated sewage,
and deliver it directly to the lands of the buyer, over the
objections of downstream appropriators that waste water
was not subject to disposition by the city after it had been
used by the city and started on its way back to the stream."
The Wyoming Supreme Court felt that cities should
be allowed great latitude in disposing of sewage; 7 the court
fashioned a special rule for sewage effluent when it stated
that cities should not be restricted by a requirement that
sewage always come under the rules for waste water. 8
In an often quoted passage, the court said:
Even in this state, where the conservation of water
for irrigation is so important, we would not care to
hold that in disposing of sewage the city could not
adopt some means that would completely consume
it. It might, we think, be diverted to waste places,
or to any chosen place where it would not become
a nuisance, without any consideration of the demands of water users who might be benefited by
its disposition in some other manner. "
However, the court did stop short of giving the city
complete dominion over its effluent: once sewage had been
discharged into the stream from which the water had been
taken, the city had no further right of disposition and the
effluent was state property, subject to appropriation.7
Generally abandonment of a right to recapture waste
water" has required a concurrence of intent and relinquishment of possession. 2 But mere relinquishment of specific
particles of waste water has been held not to constitute
65. Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing Company, supra note 35.
66. Id. at 772. Also see text accompanying note 39, supra.
67. For an analysis of total containment water quality control systems, see
Comment, Cessation of Return Flow as a Means of Complying with Pollution Control Laws, 12 LAND & WATER L. REV. 431 (1977).
68. Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing Company, supra note 35,
at 772.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 773.
71. See Note, supra note 48.
72. See HUTCHINS, supra note 10, at 262.
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abandonment of the right to use future waste waterj 3
Mere passage of time has also been held not to prevent an
appropriator from recapturing his waste water; even when
water had run to waste for 35 years, the Wyoming Supreme
Court refused to find an abandonment of the right of recapture. 4 The court pointed out that the wasted water is
always different from year to year.75
EFFECT OF THAYER

The effect of the Thayer decision is to extend to Wyoming the rule of the Colorado Supreme Court in Fulton that
a water importer has the right to reuse, successively use,
and make disposition of his waste water. 6 The Wyoming
Supreme Court used the Fulton result to justify the right
of an importer to change the point at which he discharges
his waste water." The court was thus able to reach the same
conclusion as in Metro,"8 but relied exclusively on the imported water concepts elaborated in Fulton, thus restricting
its application to waste water derived from imported
water." The court noted the Metro rule that changes in
points of discharge of waste water are not governed by the
same rules as changes in points of diversion, but also pointed
out that it had been severely criticized." The court's route
to its decision clearly suggests that it did not yet wish to
adopt the Metro rule for waste water derived from intrabasin water.
In one respect the Wyoming Supreme Court went beyond the Fulton decision, on which it had relied so heavily.
In Fulton, the issue of Denver's possible abandonment of
waste water derived from imported water was raised but
not decided."l In Thayer, the court decided that imported
73. Stevens v. Oakdale Irr. Dist., supra note 50.
74. Binning v. Miller, supra note 38, at 62.
75. Id.
76. City and County of Denver Board of Water Commissioners v. Fulton
Irrigating Ditch Company, supra note 14, at 146.
77. Thayer v. City of Rawlins, supra note 8.
78. See text accompanying note 54, supra.
79. Thayer v. City of Rawlins, supra note 8, at 957, 958.
80. Id. at 957.
81. City and County of Denver Board of Water Commissioners v. Fulton
Irrigating Ditch Company, supra note 14, at 150.
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water was not subject to abandonment, but restricted its
holding to the defendants."
DIFFICULTIES IMPLICIT IN THAYER

Although the court said in Thayer that its discussion
and disposition of the case were narrowly drawn,"3 the
decision still raises a number of difficulties which may
return to haunt the court. These problems have to do with
abandonment of the right to successively use or dispose of
waste water, the rights of North Platte appropriators, and
the jurisdiction of the state engineer and board of control
over such matters as total confinement of municipal effluent and transfers of water rights.
Abandonment of Imported Water
In Thayer, the court's holding that the city could not
abandon its imported water was restricted to the Sugar
Creek defendants. 4 In its disposition of Fulton, the Colorado
Supreme Court noted in passing two aspects of the abandonment question. First, the court quoted from Stevens the
ruling that an appropriator loses his property interest in
imported water when he discharges it without intention to
recapture, but that any abandonment is restricted to the
particles of water and does not extend to the water right
itself. However, the Fulton court neither accepted nor rejected the proposition."
But the Fulton court did note that Denver had made
quite a good record to the effect that it never intended to
abandon any imported water and that it intended future
reuse, successive use, and disposition after use of the imported water since it first began to import."8 Thus, the court
seemed to leave open the possibility that intent to abandon
could go beyond the mere relinquishment of a certain corpus
of water, and might extend to the right of successive use
and disposition after use.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Thayer v. City of Rawlins, supra note 8.
Id. at 955.
Id. at 956.
City and County of Denver Board of Water Commissioners v. Fulton
Irrigating Ditch Company, supra note 14, at 150.

86. Id.
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In deciding the abandonment issue in Thayer, the
Wyoming Supreme Court stated that the Fulton rule conferred on the city the right, as to the defendant Sugar
Creek appropriators, to change its point of discharge."
The court concluded that this city right to change its point of
discharge was not subject to abandonment; it cited Binning
as authority for the proposition that a senior appropriator
has the right to recapture waste and seepage water, even
after a lapse of 35 years, and cited Stevens to the same
effect. 8
0 allowed a senior
But both Stevens 9 and Binning"
appropriator of water to decrease or even stop the flow of
discharge water so that he could reuse it. They did not
address the question of any right to change the point of
discharge itself. In Thayer the court felt that such a right
was implicit in the city's unrestricted right of successive
use and disposition, and in the city's right to stop importing. " And in an apparent recognition that the matter of
intent might have some bearing on the issue of abandonment of imported water, the court suggested that a 1922
conveyance by deed of some of the city's effluent placed
the city in a stronger position to resist allegations of abandonment. 2

A different approach to the question of abandonment
is suggested by two Federal cases. In Ramshorn Ditch Co. v.
8 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals said
United States,"
that while a prior appropriator has the right to reuse
seepage and waste water, such water has been abandoned
when it has been allowed to return to its natural channel
with no intent to recapture it. The court made it plain that
it meant an abandonment of more than the mere corpus of
water discharged, as discussed in Stevens. Rather, an appropriation by another of the water abandoned would prevent
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Thayer v. City of Rawlins, supra note 8, at 955.
Id.
Stevens v. Oakdale Irr. Dist., supra note 50.
Binning v. Miller, supra note 38, at 60.
Thayer v. City of Rawlins, supra note 8.
Id. at 956.
Ramshorn Ditch Co. v. United States, 269 F. 80 (8th Cir. 1920).
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the one abandoning the water from raising any future
claim to it, if he had waited beyond a reasonable time.
In United States v. Haga,4 an appropriation of waste
water from a canal was upheld when it was shown that the
canal company allowed the waste and gave no indication
of intent to recapture it. The right to recapture was held
to have been abandoned, and the canal company was prevented from disposing of this water to its customers.
If, as the court points out in Thayer, an importer is
given the right of successive use, disposition, and change
in point of discharge because he should be given the benefits
of his own efforts in bringing a new supply of water to a
stream,5° it does not follow that those rights cannot be
abandoned. The reason for extending these rights to the
importer is to allow him to recover his costs and to encourage development of water resources. If an importer
does not use these rights it is a clear indication that he
sees no present advantage in doing so.
But Thayer throws up an obstacle to any use of the
importer's waste water; the case clearly warns a prospective appropriator who might be willing to rely on the high
probability of continued importation that he cannot rely on
continued abandonment by the importer. The inevitable
result will be a reluctance to put the waste water to use
for fear of losing a large investment. Therefore, the water
will tend to run to waste in the foreign drainage.
The same objectives of rewarding and promoting
water development through importation could be accomplished, and the prospective appropriator of waste water
derived from imported water could be placed in a more
secure position, if the importer were required to assert his
rights at the outset. If, within a reasonable time, an importer could find another use for his waste water, or if he
could find a buyer for it, he should be allowed to assert
his rights in that waste water. If, however, the importer
allowed the waste water to escape his control for an un94. United States v. Haga, 276 F. 41 (S.D.Idaho 1921).
95. Thayer v. City of Rawlins, supra note 8, at 955.
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reasonable time, thus suggesting he had no better use for
it, he would have abandoned it to any subsequent appropriator. This principle could be codified in a statute requiring the importer to make a timely application to the
state engineer for a permit to make successive use or disposition of waste water.
Again, these suggested rules need not displace the
right of a prior appropriator to reuse his return flows for
the same purpose, beginning at any time, even if such reuse
is totally consumptive. For example, a flood irrigator could
either recycle waste water by pumping it to the top of the
field, or install a sprinkler on the field, thus avoiding any
waste of water. In this respect, Binning and Bower would
remain intact. This right of reuse is justified by the principle that a prior appropriator should be able to make the
maximum use of his water without answering to junior
appropriators, so long as the reuse is for the same purpose
on the same lands. In this respect, a subsequent appropriator
of foreign return flows would simply be placed in the same
position as if the flows were from an in-basin source."
Rights of North Platte Appropriators
Two Wyoming cases, Binning and Bower, serve to
illustrate another difficulty caused by the Thayer rules.
In Bower, the court allowed Bower to appropriate seepage
from the Big Horn Canal and invested him with rights
superior to subsequent appropriators on the Big Horn River,
toward which the seepage flowed until Bower intercepted
it. 7 Bower's right was subject to the right of the canal
company to stop the seepage,9" a situation analogous to the
right of a prior appropriator to intercept waste water for
reuse as in Binning."
In both Binning.. and Bower,'' the court held that
water which if not intercepted would naturally reach a
stream is appropriable. The court's rationale was as follows:
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See text accompanying note 48, supra.
Bower v. Big Horn Canal Association, supra note 40.
Id. at 601.
Binning v. Miller, supra note 38, at 62.
Id. at 61.
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We would certainly discourage development and
retard the full and efficient use of our precious
water supply were we now to say that persons
who save return flows and seepage before they
reach a stream and put the water to beneficial use
have no protection in law, that latecomers who subsequently seek rights from the stream itself can
take the water as against the persons who have
put it to beneficial use for years. °2
But Thayer creates just this situation. As an illustration, consider the case of a Sugar Creek appropriator of
Rawlins' effluent, who is senior to a North Platte appropriator situated below the point at which the effluent rejoins the North Platte.
As to the North Platte River, the city's waste water
is not imported, having originally been taken from the
North Platte. The junior North Platte appropriator is
therefore entitled to stream conditions as they were at
the time of his appropriation.' In the absence of a clear
signal from the Wyoming Supreme Court that a municipality may totally consume its effluent water under
Wyoming Hereford,04 and assuming that the effluent
ordinarily reaches the North Platte in usable quantities,'
the city will not be able to cut off his rights.
Yet Thayer allows the city to cut off a Sugar Creek
appropriator who is senior to the one on the North Platte,
simply because as to him the city's effluent is imported.
The application of importation doctrine in this case will
lead to the plainly inconsistent result that a junior appropriator's rights are superior to those of a senior appropriator.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Bower v. Big Horn Canal Association, supra note 40.
Id.
See text accompanying note 41, supra.
See text accompanying note 69, supra.
If a tributary to a stream runs intermittently or does not deliver usable
quantities to the appropriator's point of diversion on the main stream,
priorities on the tributary may be administered separately. Nebraska v.
Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589 (1945).
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JurisdictionalProblems
1. Total Containment of Sewage
In Thayer, the court held that the state engineer and
the state board of control have no authority over the appropriation of waste water derived from imported water.'
The right of disposition which the court conferred on the
City of Rawlins may cause problems if the city tries to
assert a right to totally contain its effluent.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has so far avoided
dealing with the issue of total containment of municipal
effluent, whether derived from in-basin or imported water.
The last apparent expression of the court on the subject
came in Wyoming Hereford, where it was suggested that
a city might1 0totally
consume its sewage under certain
T
circumstances.
In Thayer, the court, citing significant factual differences, declined to apply or extend the suggestion of Wyoming Hereford.0 In State By and Through Christopoulis
v. Husky Oil,1°9 where the issue was total containment of
Cheyenne's effluent by an industrial buyer, the court deferred consideration of the question when it remanded the
case to district court for joinder of the city and the board
of control.
It would be inconsistent for the court to require the use
of the state engineer and board of control in cases involving
total containment of in-basin effluent and to forbid the use
of the same agencies simply because the impounded effluent
is imported. If the importer is to be allowed to put his
waste water to another use or to sell it, surely that right
11
is subject to the requirement that the new use be beneficial.
And if in the case of the City of Rawlins, the state board
of control has a right under Section 41-3-104 of the Wyoming Statutes,"' to pass on the propriety of total containThayer v. City of Rawlins, supra note 8, at 957. 958.
See text accompanying note 69 supra, and Comment, supra note 67.
Thayer v. City of Rawlins, supra note 8, at 954.
State By and Through Christopoulis v. Husky Oil, 575 P.2d 262 (Wyo.
1978).
110. Thayer v. City of Rawlins, supra note 8, at 958 (dissenting opinion).
111. WYo. STAT. § 41-3-104 (1977).
106.
107.
108.
109.
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ment insofar as it might affect a junior North Platte appropriator," 2 surely it is an odd doctrine which would deny
the jurisdiction of the board of control to protect junior appropriators of the same water on Sugar Creek. The board
should be allowed to fashion standards for both cases. To
the extent that importation doctrine interferes with the
jurisdiction of the board of control and the state engineer,
the court should decline to apply importation doctrine.
2. Water Rights Transfers
The Wyoming Supreme Court has recently furnished
a good example of how far afield Thayer's application of the
importation doctrine has taken it with respect to jurisdiction
of the state engineer and board of control. In Basin Electric
Power Cooperative v. State Board of Control,"' the court
did not question the board's jurisdiction, but rather upheld
its decision in denying a petition for change in use and change
in place of use of water under Section 41-3-104 of the
Wyoming Statutes." 4
Three points stand out in the Basin Electric case. First,
the water in question is taken from the Laramie River and
enters the Long Lake Basin as waste water from irrigation.
The Basin is entirely enclosed by the Laramie River watershed, so that no waste water escapes from it. Although it
does not appear from the Basin Electric decision that the
court felt it was dealing with imported water, the water
which is brought into the Basin drainage is technically imported water, inasmuch as the efforts of the appropriator
have added a new water supply from another drainage.
Waste water from irrigation in the Basin does not make
its way back into the Laramie River, so that unlike the situation in Thayer, this flow is lost to the system from which
it is diverted. Yet the court allowed the board to retain
jurisdiction over a proposed transfer of this waste water to
a Laramie River buyer. '" The court is driven to make ex112. See text accompanying note 103, supra.
113. Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. State Board of Control, 578 P.2d 557
(Wyo. 1978) [hereinafter cited in text as Basin Electric].
114. WYO. STAT. § 41-3-104 (1977).
115. Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. State Board of Control, supra note
113.
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ceedingly nice distinctions when it smiles on the board in
Basin Electric but frowns in Thayer, even though the waste
water may reach the North Platte, from which it was diverted originally.
A second interesting point in Basin Electric is that the
court denied the importer there the right to dispose of his
waste water by selling it to a user in the drainage system
from which it was originally diverted."' Yet in Thayer, the
court gave the importer the unrestricted right to dispose
of his waste water, at least as to Sugar Creek users, and
left open the possibility that these flows could be sold to
users on the North Platte, from which the water was originally diverted."' Again, by applying importation rules in
Thayer, the court is constrained to make uncomfortably fine
distinctions.
Basin Electric furnishes yet a third jarring contrast
with Thayer. The importer in Basin Electric used the water
for irrigation, and in the process released waste water into
the Long Lake Basin. The court found that he could not
transfer this waste water because he had effectively
abandoned it through misuse or failure to use." 8 Yet in
Thayer, the court granted an importer the unrestricted right
to dispose of his waste water, and held that, as to the defendants in the case, such water was not subject to abandonIt is difficult to see a principled reason for the diment."
vergent results in Basin Electric and Thayer.
CONCLUSION

The root of the difficulties and inconsistencies revealed
in the Thayer decision is the court's disposition of the
threshold question whether importation principles should be
applied. In deciding to follow the importation doctrine in
this case, the court followed the example set in the Colorado
Supreme Court's treatment, in the Fulton case, of water imported to Denver by means of a- transmountain diversion
116. Id. at 559.
117. Thayer v. City of Rawlins, supra note 8, at 957,-958.
118. Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. State Board of Control, supra note
113, at 564.
119. Thayer v. City of Rawlins, supra note 8.
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which took it across the Continental Divide. There was no
possibility that any of the imported water could return to
the river system from which it had been diverted. In Thayer,
waste water had for many years been discharged into a
channel connecting with the stream from which it had been
diverted; indeed, none of the imported water had ever left
the North Platte system.
The Colorado Supreme Court has recognized that there
is a "vast distinction" between transmountain diversions
across the Continental Divide, and diversions between creeks
in close proximity to each other, particularly when those
creeks flow into the same stream at points only a few miles
from each other.12 Thayer fails to make this distinction.
The appropriation of imported water return flows
could more profitably be applied in cases nearer to Fulton
than to Thayer. As both the dissent in Thayer and the
majority in Basin Electric pointed out, the complexities of
water administration require the expertise of the state engineer and the board of control. That control should not
be diluted by applying importation doctrine to transfers
within a river system, thereby requiring different rules with
respect to junior appropriators, depending on their location
in the system. These conflicts could be minimized if importation doctrine were not applied to transfers within a river
system which has been adjudicated as a unit, nor to transfers
between river systems which have their confluence within
the State.
The importation doctrine, even when applied to transfers between river systems, should not stand in the way of
the board of control and the state engineer. In the interests
of maximum beneficial use of the state's waters, these agencies should be able to treat the waters of the state as an integrated whole.
DAVID

120.

Benson v. Burgess,

-

Colo.
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, 561 P.2d 11, 15 (1977).
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